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Abstract 
 
We test the effect of entry on the tariff choices of incumbent cellular firms.  We relate the 
change in the breadth of calling plans between 1996, when incumbents enjoyed a duopoly 
market, and 1998, when incumbents faced increased competition from personal 
communications services (PCS) firms.  Entry by PCS competitors differed across 
geographic markets due to the number of licenses left undeveloped as a result of the 
bankruptcy of some of the auctions’ winning bidders and due to variation across markets 
in the time required to build a sufficiently large network of wireless infrastructure.  We 
find that incumbents increase tariff variety in markets with more entrants and that this 
effect is not explained by demographic heterogeneity or cost differences in maintaining 
calling plans across markets.  We also find that incumbents are more likely to upgrade 
their technology from the old analog technology to the new digital technology in markets 
with more entry, suggesting that entry also has indirect effects on tariff choice via firms’ 
technology adoption decisions. 
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Introduction 
 
This paper studies how market structure affects nonlinear pricing strategies using data 
from US cellular telecommunications markets in the mid to late 1990s.  In particular, we 
look at how entry and differences in number of competitors affect the number of different 
pricing plans that cellular firms offer.  In industries such as mobile communications, 
firms employ nonlinear pricing strategies to segment consumers by their demand for the 
products, here the volume of calls, and price-discriminate based on consumers’ 
preferences for the product.  The cellular industry experiences considerable entry in the 
second half of the 1990s after the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) awarded 
licenses to new spectrum for mobile communications services.  By 1998, we observe 
significant variation in the amount of entry by Personal Communication Services (PCS) 
providers across cellular markets.  The paper develops a simple model to predict the 
effect that such a change in market structure has on firms’ nonlinear pricing strategies, in 
particular how many different pricing plans to offer to optimally exploit heterogeneity in 
consumer preferences.  We then test the implications of the model using data on the 
behavior of cellular incumbents both prior and subsequent to the entry of PCS 
competitors. 
 
For many subscription services, firms compete in menus of nonlinear tariffs.  When firms 
offer such menus, the number of tariffs offered has important welfare implications.  
Introducing an additional tariff provides a better match with the tastes of some 
consumers, allowing firms to steal demand from their competitors through finer price 
discrimination.  At the same time, each tariff adds fixed costs of administering the plan.  
Our theoretical model shows that the number of firms has an ambiguous effect on the 
number of tariffs offered, depending on the balance between strategic incentives to 
introduce tariffs and cost considerations of tariff introductions. 
 
We use heterogeneity in the degree of entry across well-defined geographic markets to 
test its effect on the change in the number of plans offered by the incumbent providers.  
We find that incumbents introduce more calling plans in markets with more entrants.  
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This effect is not explained by demographic characteristics of these markets or firm-
specific factors, suggesting that the strategic incentives dominate cost considerations.  
During the time period of our study, many cellular markets undergo a transition from an 
older, analog, technology to a newer, digital, technology.  This transition allows us to 
also test the effect of market structure on technology adoption.  We find that incumbents 
in markets with more entrants are more likely to upgrade their technology from analog to 
digital.  Moreover, incumbents more drastically phase out analog tariffs in markets with 
more entrants, frequently offering the two technologies side-by-side during the transition.  
Overall, incumbents in markets with more competitors make the transition to digital 
technology sooner and offer a greater variety of tariffs on the new technology than 
incumbents in markets with fewer competitors. 
 
Predictions from previous theoretical models of nonlinear pricing in oligopolies are 
limited and focus on the relationship between market structure and the curvature of 
nonlinear pricing schedules.  Among exclusive agency models, Stole (1995), for 
example, derives firms’ optimal nonlinear pricing strategies to exploit consumer 
heterogeneity in a single dimension of preferences, such as consumers’ vertical taste for 
quality.1  In equilibrium, he finds that firms serve a product of optimal quality to 
consumers with either low or high quality valuations, but distort downward the quality of 
the product they offer to consumers with intermediate quality valuations.  Increased 
competition lowers price schedules toward marginal cost, increasing market coverage and 
reducing quality distortion.2 
 
Stole (1995), as does the majority of the theoretical literature on nonlinear pricing, 
assumes positive entry costs for firms but zero fixed costs per quality level offered.  As a 
result, firms offer fully nonlinear pricing schedules defined over a continuum of qualities, 
allowing an examination of the effect of nonlinear pricing on quality dispersion and 
                                                 
1 Armstrong and Vickers (2001) and Rochet and Stole (2002) are two rare exceptions that analyze a 
monopolist or duopolist’s nonlinear pricing strategy in the context of more realistic, multi-dimensional 
consumer preference heterogeneity. 
2 Similar results arise in other differentiated products, oligopolistic setups, including Spulber’s (1989) 
location model and Gal-Or’s (1988) model of product differentiation using consumer taste parameters. 
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distortion.  The implications of these models have been tested in a number of empirical 
contexts.  Rysman and Busse (2004) analyze the effect of market structure on the shape 
of the advertising price schedules offered by yellow pages directories and McManus 
(2003) provides empirical evidence for the “no distortion at the top” feature predicted by 
theory using data on quantity discounting in coffee shop pricing.3  These papers abstract 
from the fact that in practice, we rarely observe continuous nonlinear pricing functions 
being offered to consumers.  In many industries, such as electricity, Internet service 
provision, telecommunications and subscription services, firms instead employ menus of 
two-part tariffs rather than a continuous nonlinear pricing function.  One possible way to 
model pricing that takes the form of menus of two-part tariffs is by introducing a fixed 
cost of offering each quality level into the firm’s pricing problem. 
 
Wilson (1993) does so in a monopoly framework to show that as the number of two-part 
tariffs increases, in the limit, the model converges to that for a fully nonlinear tariff.  
Furthermore, he finds that in his set-up, relatively few two-part tariffs are necessary to 
realize most of the profit gains from a completely nonlinear tariff.  Miravete (2004a) 
confirms this result empirically in the early cellular industry, estimating that the mean 
foregone profits from not offering an additional calling plan amount to four percent of the 
profits attainable with a fully nonlinear tariff.  Miravete’s results assume that there are no 
cost effects on the part of either provider or consumers in offering additional tariffs, 
which we investigate below.  We extend Wilson’s (1993) work to the case of an 
oligopoly using a setup similar to that of Oren, Smith, and Wilson (1983) who analyze an 
oligopolist’s optimal choice of a fully nonlinear tariff in a Cournot equilibrium.  We 
assume instead that firms incur a fixed cost of offering a particular pricing plan.  As a 
result, the firm chooses both the number of two-part tariffs to offer and the prices that 
characterize each tariff. 
 
Our theoretical results predict that for a given number of tariffs, as additional firms enter 
the market, the fraction of consumers that participate in the market increases and total 
                                                 
3 Several recent empirical papers (Miravete and Röller 2004, Reiss and White 2001) estimate structural 
models of nonlinear pricing to uncover the underlying consumer preference functions and then evaluate 
the effect of policy changes on consumer demand. 
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industry profits and welfare increase.  While we do not solve explicitly for the 
equilibrium number of tariffs to offer in equilibrium, the model highlights two opposing 
effects that determine how the optimal number of two-part tariffs varies with the number 
of competitors a firm faces. 
 
First, as firms “fill up the space” of nonlinear contracts, they better address consumer 
heterogeneity and price-discriminate more finely.  By introducing an additional tariff, a 
firm is able to steal those consumers from its competitors for whom the additional pricing 
plan provides an overall better match between consumers’ tastes for volume of calls and 
plan specifics than the portfolio of pre-existing plans.  This strategic effect to introduce 
additional calling plans increases with the number of competitors who in equilibrium 
capture equal shares of consumers.  At the same time, adding an additional tariff requires 
the firm to incur additional fixed costs, which offsets the profit gains due to business 
stealing.  With more competitors in the market, per-firm revenues to cover these fixed 
costs are lower.  The relationship between the optimal number of two-part tariffs and the 
number of competitors is thus ambiguous: a firm introduces additional tariffs if the 
strategic effect dominates the fixed cost effect, but may reduce its tariff offerings if each 
tariff by itself is very costly to maintain. 
 
Our work relates to the literature on optimal product variety, with the main difference 
being that in nonlinear pricing, price is the characteristic of the product over which the 
firm differentiates, resulting in different welfare implications.  Similar to our results, 
however, the theoretical literature stresses two main influences on a firm’s choice of 
product variety.4  First, it may be profitable to offer multiple product varieties to better 
satisfy heterogeneous customers’ tastes and thus increase revenues, as long as such 
revenue gains outweigh any losses in economies of scale in the production of each 
variety.  Second, firms may adjust the number of product varieties they offer in response 
to entry (Judd 1985) or to deter future entry by preempting the product space 
(Schmalensee 1978, Bonanno 1987).  Berry and Waldfogel (2001) empirically test these 
                                                 
4 See Spence (1976) and Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) for general discussions.  Lancaster (1990) provides an 
excellent survey of the relevant literature. 
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models by investigating the effect of consolidation after the 1996 Telecommunications 
Act on station variety in the radio market.  They find that mergers reduce station entry 
and increase the number of formats available per station, consistent with higher 
concentration increasing overall variety. 
 
Since our theoretical model demonstrates that the number of competitors has an 
ambiguous effect on tariff variety, the actual effect is an empirical question.  We offer 
empirical evidence from the mobile telecommunications industry of the late 1990s.5  Our 
theoretical model assumes fixed costs of offering additional calling plans as the 
justification for firms competing in menus of two-part calling plans.  In the cellular 
industry, these fixed costs include costs of developing, marketing, and administering the 
plan for the firms as well as increased time spent by consumers understanding and 
comparing the plans.  Experimental evidence presented in Iyengar and Lepper (2000) 
suggests that such consumer optimization costs may be significant and that “choice-
overload” by consumers may lower firm profits. 
 
We use detailed data on the pricing plans offered by cellular incumbents in 1996 and in 
1998 to test the effect of entry on tariff variety by comparing the experiences of cellular 
incumbents across different geographic markets over this time period.  Starting as 
duopoly markets prior to mid-1996, the geographic markets experience different levels of 
entry by winners of the FCC’s PCS auctions that developed their licenses for service by 
1998.  Variation in the introduction of service is due to two main factors, which are 
arguably exogenous to tariff choices.  A significant fraction of the licenses are left 
undeveloped due to the bankruptcy of winning bidders.  In addition, there is variation in 
market geographic features that affect the time required to build a network of wireless 
transmission towers that is sufficiently large to provide wireless service of a satisfactory 
quality. 
 
                                                 
5 The setting complements earlier papers on pricing in the cellular industry, including Parker and Röller 
(1997) and Busse (2000) who focus on the early cellular industry of the 1980s when competition was 
confined to duopoly markets. 
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During the period of our sample, the mobile communications industry is transformed not 
only by changing market structure, but also by the introduction of marketable digital 
transmission technologies.  As a by-product we also provide evidence of the effect of 
market structure on technology adoption, an area that has received limited attention in the 
empirical literature on technological diffusion.6 
 
Our empirical work compares the number of plans introduced by the cellular incumbents 
across markets with varying amounts of entry.  We find that incumbents introduce more 
plans for digital service and simultaneously eliminate more plans for analog service in 
markets with more entrants.  Most carriers have either fully replaced or begun the 
transition toward full replacement of the older analog technology with the newer digital 
technology by 1998.  We find that the presence of additional competitors spurs this 
technology upgrade: firms phase out tariffs based on the old technology and introduce 
tariffs based on the new technology more fully in markets with more competitors.  Our 
theoretical model predicts that greater fixed costs of offering a calling plan should have a 
negative effect on the number of tariffs offered and that increased competition should 
exacerbate this effect because costs are duplicated across more firms.  Using advertising 
cost data across our geographic markets we find consistent, but not statistically 
significant, evidence in support of this. 
 
We also find an effect of entry on the technology transition itself.  In markets with more 
entry, incumbents are more likely to adopt the digital technology controlling for other 
factors and instrumenting for the endogeneity of entry.  We therefore find both a direct 
effect and an indirect effect, via technology choice, of entry on the number of plans 
offered. 
 
                                                 
6 There are a number of theoretical studies, for example Reinganum (1981), Riordan (1992), and Götz 
(1999), that analyze the effect of market structure on the speed of technological diffusion and technology 
adoption. The empirical literature focuses primarily on measuring the role of firm characteristics and 
first-mover advantages in technology diffusion, but not on assessing the effect of market structure on 
technology adoption per se. 
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The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  In the next section we discuss a 
theoretical model relating number of competitors and tariff variety choice.  In the 
following section we provide background on the wireless services market during the time 
period of our study and describe the data we employ.  We then discuss our empirical 
results and conclude. 
 
 
Theoretical Model 
 
In this section, we present a simple model to demonstrate the major tradeoffs that 
underlay an oligopolist’s pricing decisions when firms compete for heterogeneous 
consumers using menus of two-part tariffs.  We extend previous models of nonlinear 
pricing (Oren, Smith, and Wilson 1983, Wilson 1993) to consider the effect that 
competition has on the optimal number of tariffs each firm offers. 
 
Set-Up 
 
We consider a two-stage game between J symmetric firms that compete in a market with 
heterogeneous consumers.  In the first stage, firms simultaneously choose the number, n–
1, of two-part tariffs to offer in the second period.  In the second stage, they choose the 
fixed fee and per-unit price for each two-part tariff given the number of tariffs chosen in 
the first stage.  Consumers’ preferences differ along a single dimension and we assume 
that their types, t, are uniformly distributed on [0,1].  As in Wilson (1993), type t’s 
demand function is . ]1[),( pttpD −=
 
We assume that firms face marginal per-unit costs of zero and a fixed cost per plan of K 
that is independent of the number of consumers choosing the plan.  It is the presence of 
fixed costs of offering additional plans that induces firms to offer a menu of two-part 
tariffs rather than a fully nonlinear tariff.  These costs could arise on the firm side in the 
form of marketing expenses or administrative costs or on the consumer side in the form 
7 
of additional complexity of comparing costs under different plants.7  While we have 
chosen to model the fixed per-tariff cost on the firm side, it is equivalent to decrease each 
buyer’s willingness to pay by a fixed cost that is a linear function of the number of tariffs 
available.8 
 
Figure 1 provides evidence that calling plans involve fixed marketing costs and exhibit 
economies of scope on the provider side.  The figure plots 1996 and 1998 marketing 
expenditures per plan against the total number of plans offered by the provider across all 
markets for eleven of the sample firms.9  We also include a fitted line that predicts 
marketing expenditures per plan as a function of a quadratic expansion of the number of 
plans.  This fitted line lies between two extreme cases: a horizontal line that shows 
marketing expenditures per plan in the absence of economies of scope, and a steeply 
declining curve that represents the case of no incremental fixed costs from offering an 
additional plan beyond the provider’s initial marketing expenditures.  Thus, each 
additional plan adds some incremental costs, albeit at a decreasing rate.  On the consumer 
side, menu costs or plan evaluation costs are more difficult to measure.  Anecdotal 
evidence (Boney 1997, Marshall 1996) suggests, however, that they are important. 
 
The contribution to firm j’s profits from a customer of type t purchasing its i-th tariff is: 
1...,2,1   ),()( −=+=Π niPtpDpt jijijiji  (1) 
 
                                                 
7 An explanation sometimes suggested for why firms offer a menu of two part tariffs is that cellular firms 
exploit consumers' inability to predict their demand correctly by locking them into contracts.  For 
example, consumers may not know the variance of their usage and "overbuy" to be safe, or alternatively, 
they may be too conservative in estimating their usage.  In this case firms make money on consumers 
going over their expected usage by offering convex pricing plans.  While this may be an explanation for 
why cellular firms require subscribers to pre-commit to a convex pricing plan, it does not explain why 
they require them to commit to a two-part tariff rather than a fully nonlinear tariff. 
8 Such a fixed cost does not affect the consumers’ marginal willingness to pay, leaving the demand 
function unaffected. However, it will affect consumers’ choice of whether to purchase at all.  Firms 
would need to compensate consumers for this cost by reducing the fixed fees (across all two-part tariffs) 
proportionally, the equivalent of an additional fixed cost per tariff on the firm side. 
9 Marketing expenditures per plan are based on the total number of plans offered across the 100 markets in 
our sample. 
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where  is the marginal price and  is the fixed fee for firm j’s i-th tariff.  These are 
ordered so that  and .  The 
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Firm’s Optimization Problem 
 
Firm j chooses n–1 pairs of marginal prices and fixed fees, ji
j
i Pp , , i=1,2,…,n–1, to 
maximize aggregate profits across its set of two-part tariffs: 
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Because the customers’ demand functions are ordered by their types, the set of types t 
choosing the i-th tariff is an interval  where t  and t  are the 
boundaries of the type space.  The firms’ choices of prices and fixed fees determine the 
cut-off points, , that make a consumer indifferent between tariffs i–1 and i: 
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This expression incorporates the outside option by setting consumer surplus for 
consumers that are indifferent between the outside good and the first tariff, with a type of 
, equal to the amount attained from purchasing the outside good.jt1
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10 Note that menu costs on the consumer side (such as the cost of evaluating available cellular plans) would 
require that the firm decrease the fixed fees on all of the inside goods so as to keep consumers indifferent 
between them and the outside good so that firm profits are reduced by an equivalent amount.  This is why 
the effect of such menu costs is equivalent to the role of the fixed cost per plan, K , in our model. 
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Second-Stage Oligopoly Equilibrium 
 
To compute the oligopoly solution, it is convenient to express the firm problem in terms 
of a choice of n–1 pairs of marginal prices  and type cutoffs : jp jt
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The first term within the summation represents the variable-fee revenues received from 
consumers on the i-th tariff.  The second term indicates that all types choosing a tariff 
 pay a fixed-fee increment of ii ≥' 1−− ii PP .  Applying a change of variables from type t 
to the corresponding quantity consumed, q, yields: 
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where  and Q  define the volume band, , for 
consumers that choose the i-th tariff.  Note that the quantity that the indifferent type t  
consumes on tariff i-1, , is less than the quantity she will consume on tariff i, , 
because this marginal consumer faces a lower marginal price, but higher fixed fee, on the 
th tariff than on the st tariff. 
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We solve for a Cournot oligopoly in the spirit of Oren, Smith, and Wilson (1983), using 
an equilibrium concept in which each firm takes as given the “cumulative” market share 
of customers that order q units or less.11  The policy of firm j is thus defined by a function 
                                                 
11 We choose this strategic variable because alternative strategic variables suggested by Oren, Smith, and 
Wilson (1983) have unappealing features for our application.  Taking as given the percentage of each 
customer type completely loyal to other firms leads to firms behaving as monopolists and does not reflect 
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the total fraction of buyers purchasing q units or less from its competition as 
, and the density of consumers that the firm itself captures reduces to 
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After applying symmetry, the necessary condition for the optimal choice of marginal 
price  is given by: ip
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The impact of a price increase for an oligopolist (i.e. when J>1) differs from that for a 
monopolist since the firm only serves a fraction of the density of consumers.  This leads 
to the following four effects.  First, the density of consumers served by the other firms 
reduces the gain to the firm from inframarginal consumers on tariff i, as captured by the 
first term in the first-order condition.  Second, increasing the per-unit price on tariff i 
leads both to consumers on tariff i decreasing the quantity consumed and to competitors 
capturing a larger share of consumers, the typical effect of a marginal change in price.  
The second and third terms in equation (6) together represent the revenue lost due to this 
demand response. 
 
The last three terms in equation (6) represent the effects on revenue of changes in fixed 
fees applied to the firm’s share of demand.  A price increase implies that the firm loses 
revenues on fixed fees from consumers shifting their purchases to competitors (the third 
to last term).  In addition, an increase in the per-unit price on tariff i in isolation requires a 
                                                                                                                                                 
the fact that significant switching occurs in the cellular industry.  Using the number of orders at each 
dollar value as the firm’s strategic variable might reasonably reflect competition in the cellular market, 
but as Oren, Smith and Wilson point out the solution to this model is “complicated and uninterpretable.”  
The strategic variable we consider has the advantages of both reflecting cellular competition and being 
easily interpretable. 
12 Thus in equation (5), F(t(q)) is replaced by  and )())(( qYqtF j− ))(( jiqtF  is replaced by 
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11 
decrease of the fixed fee on tariff i and increases in the fixed fees associated with all 
tariffs above i to ensure that the boundary types , k=i,…, n–1, remain indifferent 
between adjacent tariffs (the last two terms). 
kt
 
In a symmetric Cournot equilibrium, each firm earns a share 
J
1  of customers of type t(q) 
and the cumulative density of consumers captured by the firm’s competitors simplifies to 
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The firm’s second choice variable consists of the cutoffs that define customer types for 
each tariff.  Differentiating firm j’s profit function with respect to  and again applying 
symmetry, we obtain the necessary condition for the optimal choice of the boundary type 
: 
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Firms choose each boundary type to balance four effects corresponding to the four terms 
in the first-order condition.  First, moving the cutoff decreases per-minute revenues due 
to consumers shifting away from the i-th plan (the first term).  Second, moving the cutoff 
increases per-minute revenues at the same time due to consumers shifting to plan i-1 (the 
second term).  The last two effects of moving the cutoff result from changes in fixed-fee 
revenues.  The density of consumers on the ith tariff decreases and the density of 
consumers on the i-1th tariff increases affecting the fixed fees collected on these two 
tariffs (the third term).  Finally, revenues per consumer on the ith tariff increase due to an 
                                                 
13 When J = 1, this simplifies to the monopoly condition given in Wilson (1993) of ( ) 21 1 iii ttp +−= + . 
12 
increase in its fixed fee (the fourth term).  Since each firm takes as given its share of 
consumers purchasing a given quantity or below, the number of firms in the market only 
scales each of these four effects by the same amount.  Consequently, after substituting for 
q, Y(q), and Y , this expression is independent of the number of firms: )(q
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First-Stage Analysis 
 
The optimal solution for the per-minute prices and boundary types allows us to compute 
profits in the second stage as a function of the number of two-part tariffs.  In the first 
stage, the firms choose the number of tariffs, n-1, to maximize their profits in both stages 
subject to a fixed cost per tariff of K.  Setting up the first-stage equilibrium is 
complicated by the fact that the second stage yields a tractable solution only for the case 
in which firms are symmetric in the number of plans that they offer.  Because of the 
multiplicity of possible equilibria and the difficulty in determining the optimal “off-
equilibrium” response by firms, we do not explicitly solve for the first stage equilibrium, 
but choose instead to describe qualitatively the factors each firm considers. 
 
Table 1 shows the total profits, per-firm profits, fraction of consumers served and 
consumer welfare allowing the number of firms to vary from two to six with each firm 
offering two, four or six tariffs.  For a given number of firms, total industry profits 
increase in the number of tariffs.  As the firms offer more tariffs, they fill in the tariff 
space more finely and price discriminate more effectively as evidenced by the fact that 
consumer welfare declines even though a larger fraction of consumers purchase.  The 
profit increases diminish fairly quickly though, so that little additional gain is achieved by 
offering more than six tariffs.  The welfare implications of tariff variety are thus different 
than those for product variety since consumer welfare actually declines as more tariffs are 
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added.  However, total welfare increases as tariffs are added since firms extract additional 
profits while more closely matching consumer tastes and expanding the market size. 
 
Table 1 also demonstrates that for a given number of tariffs, industry profits increase and 
consumer welfare decreases in the number of firms.  As the number of firms increases, 
firms compete to bring more previously unserved consumers onto the “low” tariffs by 
lowering the equilibrium fixed fees on all but the highest tariff.  At the same time, they 
increase the marginal prices on all but the highest tariff, since firms take as given other 
firms’ share of consumers on a particular plan.  That is, there is increased competition to 
move new consumers to “lower” tariffs than to attempt to steal share from rivals within a 
particular tariff.14  Firms gain more from the higher per-unit fees than they lose on the 
lower fixed fees so that consumer welfare declines in the number of firms, despite the 
expansion of the market resulting from the lower fixed fees, and industry profits increase.  
Profits per firm, however, decline as more firms enter the industry because the firms must 
share the aggregate profits with more rivals. 
 
Although we do not explicitly solve for the first-stage equilibrium of this model, we can 
identify two main effects of a change in the number of firms on the equilibrium number 
of tariffs from Table 1.  First, as the number of firms increases, the incentive to deviate 
and add additional tariffs increases.  By adding an appropriately designed additional 
tariff, the oligopolist can capture a segment of demand that it and its rivals do not 
currently serve.  It can “fill in the space” and better meet the heterogeneous needs of that 
segment.  Similar to cartel behavior, the deviator grabs the entire demand in that segment 
rather than sharing this demand with all other firms.  For example, in a two-firm 
equilibrium with two tariffs, each firm earns profits of 0.0687.  If one of the two firms 
were to deviate and offer three tariffs instead, it could earn profits of up to 0.1382 by 
slightly undercutting the other firm all along the distribution of consumers for a net gain 
of 0.0695.  As the number of competitors rises, the maximum net gains from deviating 
increase because per-firm profits decline, while industry profits increase.  For example, 
                                                 
14 The marginal price and fixed fee changes as a function of the number of competitors is non-monotonic so 
that no generalizations can be made. 
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with three firms, the gains from deviating and offering three rather than two tariffs 
increases to 0.0963 from 0.0695.  Figure 2 illustrates this effect in deviating from 
offering two to offering three tariffs for two through ten firms.  The same pattern is true 
in deviating from offering  tariffs from offering  tariffs for n .  This strategic 
effect leads to more tariffs as the number of firms increases.
1n + n 2>
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Second, as the number of firms increases, the fixed costs of tariffs are duplicated across 
firms.  Each firm must cover the same fixed costs per tariff, but sells to a smaller share of 
the market, reducing the amount of profits it earns per tariff.  All else being equal, this 
leads to fewer tariffs being offered as the number of firms increases.  The net effect 
depends on the magnitude of the fixed costs relative to the strategic effect and the model 
thus predicts an ambiguous relationship between number of firms in a market and number 
of plans offered by firms. 
 
 
Mobile Telecommunications Markets in the mid 1990s 
 
The data used in this study comes from Kagan World Media, a telecommunications 
consulting firm.  It consists of two snapshots of the universe of wireless contracts offered 
in the 100 largest US cellular markets at the time, which encompass approximately 60 
percent of the US population (the shaded areas in Figure 3 show the markets in our 
study).16  The first snapshot is as of February 1996, and the second one as of March 1998.  
As discussed below, this data is ideally timed to study the response by incumbents to the 
onset of new competition since between these two periods the market structure in 
wireless telecommunications changed significantly. 
 
 
                                                 
15 Note that economies of scope in tariff costs, as we find in Figure 2, would imply that it is more costly to 
move from offering two tariffs to offering three than it is to move from offering three tariffs to offering 
four and so on so that under economies of scope the strategic effect is diminished but still remains. 
16 The data capture only residential (not business) plans.  Approximately 75 percent of cellular users are 
retail consumers according to Strategy Analytics (Cellular Service Trends Industry Report, 2000) and 
IDC (Burgeoning Bluetooth, IDC Bulletin, 2000). 
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Industry Background 
 
The US cellular phone industry has its origins in 1981 when the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) awards two licenses per cellular market area (CMA) to provide 
cellular telephone services in a set of 306 metropolitan markets17 and 428 FCC-
designated rural markets covering the entire country (see a map of these areas in Figure 
3).  The local wireline company, which is generally the Regional Bell Operating 
Company in the metropolitan markets and a rural telephone company otherwise, receives 
one license to a band of spectrum.  The second license is awarded to a non-telephone 
company.  In October 1983, Ameritech Mobile initiates the first service resulting from 
these licenses in the Chicago market. 
 
The duopoly structure exists until 1994 when the FCC begins auctioning off personal 
communications services (PCS) spectrum.  The geographic market definition used for 
PCS spectrum differs from that applied to cellular markets.  51 Major Trading Areas 
(MTAs) divide the country into regions that include multiple cities or states.  MTAs are 
further subdivided into a total of 493 Basic Trading Areas (BTAs).  The bold lines in 
Figure 3 display the MTAs, which fully contain the CMAs.  A BTA is of the same size or 
slightly larger than the corresponding CMA and in most cases fully contains the cellular 
market. Upon activation of the PCS licenses, the cellular incumbents compete directly 
with PCS entrants in their entire market area.  Between December 1994 and January 
1997, the FCC sequentially auctions off the PCS spectrum in six blocks, two of which 
cover MTAs while the remainder are for the smaller BTAs.  In total, 2074 licenses were 
initially auctioned. 
 
Concurrently with the allocation of PCS licenses, cellular incumbents witness the entry of 
Nextel Communications due to its transition from providing mobile radio services to 
offering competing wireless services.  Nextel begins a national rollout of its service in the 
Chicago market in September 1996.  By 1998, Nextel has entered 65 of the 100 largest 
                                                 
17 The market definition followed metropolitan statistical areas as delineated by the Census Bureau in its 
1980 Census of Population. 
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cellular markets.  Despite Nextel’s initial focus on business customers, we treat it as a 
viable competitor to the cellular incumbents, similar to the PCS entrants. 
 
By 1998, cellular incumbents therefore face potential entry of one specialized mobile 
operator and up to six PCS service providers. The number of competitors actually 
operating in a given market subsequent to the auctions’ conclusion is driven by two main 
factors.  First, a significant number of licenses, in particular those awarded to small 
businesses are initially left undeveloped.  Several of the largest winning bidders in 
restricted small business auctions “overbid,” forcing them into bankruptcy soon after the 
auction ended.  The licenses from bankrupt or insolvent bidders remain undeveloped 
while their status is resolved.  In April 1999, the FCC re-auctions most of these 347 
undeveloped licenses.18  
 
Second, there is a significant lag, on the order of one year or more, between the initial 
award of a license and the initiation of service in the market while the carrier puts in 
place a network of towers to broadcast signals to its users’ mobile phones.  This time lag 
is commonly referred to as the “build-out” delay. Table 2 shows the PCS launch dates by 
market for the largest 100 markets over the period from 1995 to 1999.  Since Nextel’s 
network is cellular-like and consists of a dense grid of transmitters, its national rollout of 
service is constrained by similar build-out requirements.   
 
While it is difficult to precisely characterize the build-out delay, characteristics of the 
market affect the size and difficulty of constructing the tower network required to offer 
PCS service of sufficient quality and, consequently, the time it takes to deploy service in 
that market.  To enforce the development of the awarded licenses, the FCC also requires 
PCS licensees to meet specific coverage requirements.  These coverage requirements 
amount to providing adequate service to at least between 25 and 33 percent of the market 
area’s population, depending on the license, within a five-year time window after the 
award of the license.  The build-out delay is affected by factors such as the market’s 
                                                 
18 The largest single source of undeveloped licenses is due to NextWave’s bankruptcy, leading to the return 
of 95 licenses.  As of 2002, these licenses are still not developed. 
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subscriber base, its area and terrain, and zoning requirements, providing exogenous 
variation in the number of competitors across markets.  These factors suggest instruments 
to control for potential endogeneity of entry across markets. Endogeneity would arise if 
firms chose to first build out less competitive markets, one feature of which are 
incumbents’ pricing strategies, including the number of pricing plans offered. 
 
To predict the delay in building out a market, we use measures of market size and 
geographic characteristics.  The CMAs’ 1999 population from the 2000 Census of 
Population captures the market’s potential subscriber base, which has an ambiguous 
effect on entry.  A higher potential market size makes entry more attractive, while at the 
same time making it more difficult to satisfy build-out requirements.  We collect 
information on the CMAs’ average elevation and standard deviation of elevation as a 
measure of variability in the terrain and thus of geographic impediments to constructing a 
network of transmission towers in the area.  They are derived from grid-based elevation 
data collected by the US Geological Survey.  We retain those elevation measures that 
correspond to point locations within each CMA to compute the average and standard 
deviation of the elevation.  Last, we include the percent of the CMA’s area that 
corresponds to the area’s central cities, as defined by the 2000 Census of Population, as a 
measure of the degree of urbanization of the market, which would facilitate satisfying 
build-out requirements. 
 
Because of the variation in entry and the clear definition of tariffs and markets in this 
industry, it offers an attractive setting in which to test the effect of market structure on 
tariff variety.  The available data is ideally timed to do so.  The first wave of data from 
February 1996 marks a point in time shortly before the PCS operators start the launch of 
commercial service in the markets that they secured in the FCC auctions.  As of early 
1996, the sole providers of wireless telephone services in all but two of the markets 
covered by the data continue to be the incumbent cellular duopolists.19,20  The second 
                                                 
19 The only exceptions are the Baltimore and Washington CMAs, which were dropped from the estimation 
sample. 
20 Firms that re-sell wireless service on a licensed carrier’s network are also present during the time of our 
data set, but represent a small portion of the market throughout.   According to RCR Wireless News, the 
top 20 resellers together have 747,994 subscribers or approximately 1.96 percent of the market in 1996, 
18 
snapshot of contracts is from March 1998, when a majority of the markets have already 
experienced the entry of one or more PCS providers.21   
 
 
Wireless Service Plans 
 
Most wireless service is sold under nonlinear pricing schemes or “three-part tariffs.”  
Consumers pay a monthly fee for which they get a number (which may be zero) of 
included peak and off-peak minutes.  Usage above the number of minutes included in the 
plan is charged at a per-minute rate.  Both incoming and outgoing calls count against the 
customer’s usage.  In addition, various additional charges may apply, such as charges for 
placing a call that terminates outside the calling area specified in the consumer’s contract. 
 
The network of markets covered by the provider’s licenses limits a plan’s calling area.  
During the time period of our study, the network of markets covered by the cellular 
incumbents’ licenses is, in most cases, small.  Across the 100 markets in our data, 24 
unique providers offer cellular service in 1996.  Of these, 15 firms operate licenses in at 
most five of the top 100 cellular markets, while only five carriers (Air Touch Cellular, 
AT&T Wireless, Bell Atlantic Mobile, GTE Mobilnet and Southwestern Bell Mobile) 
offer service in 15 or more of these markets.  One effect of the small size of cellular 
networks is that the costs for providers to complete calls that terminate or originate 
outside their network area are substantial because of fees to access other providers’ 
networks.  Cellular carriers incorporate these costs into their pricing structure by offering 
local calling plans only, where the consumer’s local calling area is her CMA and 
additional charges apply to all calls originating or terminating outside the CMA. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
955,083 subscribers (1.96 percent market share) in 1997, and 1,152,315 subscribers or 1.89 percent of the 
market in 1998. 
21 To construct the 1998 snapshot, which continues to use cellular market areas as the relevant market 
definition, Kagan World Media mapped the PCS providers’ BTA and MTA market areas to the 
corresponding CMAs to derive an accurate measure of the set of competitors and their tariff offerings in 
each market. 
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With the entry of PCS firms and the gradual build-out of larger networks, carriers begin 
introducing calling plans with larger regional or nationwide calling areas.  Such calling-
plan families by coverage area serve as additional tariff varieties to induce customer 
sorting by usage area.22  The plans offered by cellular incumbents that we observe in the 
data between early 1996 and early 1998 do not yet reflect the introduction of plans with 
wider geographic reach, but solely reflect changes in the variety of cellular incumbents’ 
offerings of local calling plans.23 
 
To capture market-level cost differences in promoting calling plans, we complement the 
pricing data with data on advertising costs.  Since television advertising does not 
necessarily differ across markets and cost data on newsprint advertising is only sparsely 
available, we focus on radio advertising.  Although cellular carriers use multiple channels 
to advertise calling plans, the radio cost data should provide an accurate proxy to the 
extent that the different channels are substitutes.  Radio advertising cost data is available 
from the Marketer’s Guide to Media at the level of television markets (DMAs).  It 
measures the cost per rating point of men 18 and older for a 60-second spot in 1997.  We 
use the advertising data as described in the empirical section below to test the role of 
tariff-level fixed costs in driving changes in a carrier’s menu of calling plans, as predicted 
by the theoretical model. 
 
 
                                                 
22 In January 1997, Nextel Communications is the first wireless service provider to eliminate roaming 
(charges for placing calls while traveling outside the local calling area), but not long-distance (charges 
for calls terminating outside the local calling area), charges for customers traveling within its digital 
network composed, at the time, of fifty metropolitan areas.  AT&T Wireless introduces a flat-rate 
national calling plan without any roaming or long-distance charges, the Digital One Rate Plan, in May 
1998.   
23 For a small subset of markets, the second wave of pricing data was only collected in September 1998.  
AT&T’s Digital One Rate Plan is not offered in any of these markets as of that date.  Bell Atlantic 
Mobile’s regional plan is offered in five of these markets and was eliminated from the sample used in 
estimation. 
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Wireless Technologies  
 
Beginning in the mid 1990s, the wireless industry undergoes not only a change in the 
competitive environment due to the introduction of PCS services, but also a gradual 
upgrading of its analog networks to digital technology.  By allowing the cellular networks 
to handle a larger call volume, digital technologies improve the efficiency of spectrum 
use.  This entails significant capacity increases for the providers, while at the same time 
improving the quality and reliability of service for the consumer.  Furthermore, digital 
technologies allow for the addition of features such as call waiting, caller ID, as well as 
data and paging capabilities, introducing an additional vertical element to the service 
provision.  By 1998, however, the coverage area of digital service across the US is 
limited.  The fact that digital service relies on four different technology standards 
complicates the use of a digital phone when traveling due to a higher chance of 
inoperability.24  Initially, therefore, analog service is still the better option for low-usage 
customers who use a cell phone for emergency purposes only, justifying why carriers 
may offer both technologies simultaneously. 
 
The timing and form of digital deployment varies significantly across carriers.  While in 
1996, carriers exclusively employ analog or, in rare cases, immature digital technologies, 
by 1998 42 percent of all plan families are digital calling plans.  Over the two-year period 
of our sample, however, only approximately eight percent of providers fully upgrade all 
of their analog plans to digital plans within a given market.25  Thirty-four percent of 
providers have not yet begun digital deployment at all by 1998.  The remaining 59 
percent of providers offer customers within a given market a choice between analog and 
digital calling plans using two sets of calling plans that differ by technology. 
 
                                                 
24 The cellular and PCS providers use one of three digital technology standards, CDMA, TDMA, or GSM.  
Nextel uses Motorola’s digital iDEN technology, which combined enhanced digital cellular and two-way 
radio technology in one standard. 
25 The FCC's rules require that all cellular carriers continue to provide analog service, a requirement that is 
scheduled to expire in 2008.  However, the carriers are not required to offer new analog service plans.  In 
contrast, other mobile telephony carriers such as the PCS service providers are not required to provide 
analog service. 
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 Trends in the Number of Plans offered between 1996 and 1998 
 
A typical set of calling plans in 1996 consists of, on average, 5.89 individual plans, 
ranging across providers from three to eight plans.  These are generally analog plan 
groups.  By 1998, firms have introduced a total of 128 digital plan families across the 98 
markets, while continuing to offer 178 analog plan-groups.  Relative to 1996, the number 
of plans in an analog plan-group decreases by 0.07 on average; however, the standard 
deviation of the change is large and amounts to 1.92 plans, reflecting an uneven 
adjustment in the number of analog service plans by carriers.  A large fraction of 
providers offers both types of plans simultaneously.  Consequently, despite the slight 
decrease in the average number of analog service plans offered, companies offer an 
additional 2.80 plans in 1998.  This reflects the introduction of digital calling plans, 
which average 5.06 plans in those markets where digital service is available. 
 
The detailed nature of our price data allows us to not only analyze changes in the menu of 
plans offered over the two-year period, but to also verify that such menu changes truly 
reflect the introduction or elimination of a tariff that differs significantly from the 
remaining plans.  We focus on two features of cellular contracts that are central in 
differentiating plans from each other, the plan’s monthly fixed fee and the included peak-
minutes that the customer may use for no additional charge.26  Along these two 
dimensions, the plan offerings differ significantly within a provider’s portfolio, over time, 
and across plan technologies at the same point in time.  We do not observe tariffs that are 
fully dominated by other tariffs in the provider’s menu of offerings, or “foggy” tariffs, 
which are the subject of Miravete (2004b).  Table 3 summarizes patterns in fixed fees and 
                                                 
26 Additional contract features that are covered by the data include the number of off-peak minutes, the 
plan’s activation and termination fees, overage charges for additional peak and off-peak minutes, as well 
as the availability of optional vertical services such as call waiting or voice-mail.  Within a specific plan 
family in our data, the contracts’ features differ primarily in the peak and off-peak overage charges and 
in the included number of peak and off-peak minutes.  Ninety-eight percent of the plan families did not 
exhibit any within-family differences in activation and termination fees or contract duration, and all plan 
groups offer identical vertical features including call waiting, call forwarding, three-way calling, and 
voice mail and use the same definition of peak and off-peak hours.   
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included number of peak-minutes for the two years covered by the data, both overall and 
within providers. 
 
The table indicates significant overall variation in both fixed fees and included peak-
minutes, as indicated by the large ranges of values and standard deviations. In moving 
from 1996 to 1998, the standard deviations for both features increase for analog plans, 
suggesting that the newly introduced plans fill in the space of tariffs as opposed to 
duplicating existing tariffs.  Furthermore, the range of monthly fees has increased, while 
its mean and median have fallen.  Together, these statistics suggest that between 1996 
and 1998, providers adjust the set of tariff offerings in two ways.  On the one hand, 
providers expand the available product space by offering more expensive packages than 
previously.  On the other hand, carriers fill in parts of the lower-priced product space 
more densely, a space aimed at the majority of cellular users who have a relatively 
modest monthly demand for cellular services. 
 
Similar patterns hold for fixed fees and peak-minutes within a provider’s family of plans.  
In unreported results, we also find significant differences in the menus of calling plans 
offered by the same provider in different markets indicating that each of the carriers 
tailors its plans significantly to local markets.  Within providers, the coefficient of 
variation for fixed fees ranges between 21 and 37 percent and for peak-minutes between 
36 and 66 percent.  This is evidence that variation in number of plans across markets is 
not primarily due to firm features, a possibility we explicitly control for in our estimation. 
 
 
Demand for Cellular Services 
 
While market-level pricing data allows us to control for provider-specific characteristics 
that could affect the change in plan offerings between 1996 and 1998, exogenous demand 
factors may also affect a provider’s choice of menus.  Following earlier studies of the 
cellular industry, such as Busse (2000) and Miravete and Röller (2004), we capture the 
demand for mobile telecommunications services by market size variables, primarily the 
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market’s population, as well as demographic variables, including mean commuting time 
in the market, household income, and educational attainment.  Average commuting time 
in minutes is included as a crude measure of the additional attractiveness of a cellular 
phone to frequent drivers.  Since changes in providers’ tariff offerings may reflect 
heterogeneity in demand, we also compute Herfindahl-type indices for the heterogeneity 
in income, educational attainment, and commuting time in each market, capturing the 
probability of two randomly selected MSA residents falling into the same demographic 
category.  Table 4 provides descriptive statistics for these variables based on data from 
the 2000 Census of Population.  There is considerable variation in the markets’ 
characteristics; they range in size, for example, from New Bedford, MA with a 
population of 175,198 to the Los Angeles metro area with a population of 9,519,338. 
 
Growth in demand may, in part, be responsible for how many additional plans a carrier 
introduces in a given market.  To analyze the determinants of changes in the cellular 
incumbents’ service offerings, we would ideally use measures of how each market’s 
cellular subscriber base has changed over the two-year time period of our sample.  
Wireless services grow in popularity over the time of our sample.  The Cellular 
Telecommunications and Internet Association (CTIA) estimates that nationwide, the 
number of cellular subscribers has increased from 38.2 million in June of 1996 to 60.8 
million in June of 1998.27  Less information is available, however, on growth in the 
subscriber base at a disaggregate market level.  Consequently, we rely upon demographic 
information from the Census of Population to proxy for differences in cellular demand 
across markets, but do not control for differences within markets over time.28 
 
In summary, the data available to us consists of information from 98 markets on the menu 
of plans offered by each of the two cellular incumbents, the cost of radio advertising in 
                                                 
27 See CTIA's Semi-Annual Wireless Industry Survey, 2003. 
28 RCR Wireless News, a trade publication, collects information on cellular penetration rates by market. 
Unfortunately, this information is only available for the largest 50 markets. As a robustness check, future 
drafts of this paper will analyze cellular menus in these markets only, controlling for changes in the 
markets’ cellular subscribers over the sample period. 
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the market, and the market’s demographic attributes.  Table 5 describes each of the 
variables in detail. 
 
 
Results 
 
To determine how entry affects the choice of tariff variety by cellular incumbents we take 
advantage of the difference in number of entrants across geographic markets.  Figure 4 
summarizes the change in the number of plans offered by the cellular incumbents in each 
market by number of entrants.  We illustrate the response in plan offerings separately for 
providers that offer both analog and digital plans, for providers that have fully upgraded 
to digital service, and those that have not yet introduced any digital service.  The figure 
shows a nearly identical, increasing relationship between the number of PCS entrants and 
the average number of digital calling plans offered by digital-only carriers and “mixed” 
providers that offer both types of plans.  The relationship is non-monotonic in that the 
number of digital calling plans introduced initially falls as we move from markets with no 
PCS entrants to markets with one entrant, before then increasing in the number of 
entrants.  The figure masks, however, that there are only five markets that do not 
experience any entry by 1998.  The data show a similar pattern for analog-only providers.  
On average, providers increase the number of plans and increase them more in markets 
that experience more entry.  For providers that offer both types of service, the data show 
a negative correlation between the number of PCS entrants into a market and the change 
in the number of analog calling plans offered.  This reflects not only the effect of entry, 
however, but also that such carriers are in the process of phasing out analog service in 
lieu of digital service.29 
 
                                                 
29 Note that subsequent to 1998, we do not observe a decline in the number of calling plans that are offered 
by wireless providers, which would indicate that any changes that we observe between 1996 and 1998 
are only a temporary response to the new competitive environment. Instead, data for 1999 through 2002 
indicates that wireless providers offer approximately 5.4 plans per plan group and significantly increase 
the total number of plans offered to on average 15.1 per provider as providers differentiate service 
increasingly by coverage area (local, regional, and national). 
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To control for differences in the market’s population or other demographic characteristics 
that might affect the carriers’ incentives to change their plan offerings, we analyze the 
effect of entry more formally by estimating the following regression: 
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where  is the change in the number of plans between 1996 and 1998 for 
incumbent i in market m for technology t,  is a dummy variable indicating 
whether incumbent i offers analog-only, digital-only or mixed technologies in market m 
in 1998,  indicates whether the plans’ technology t in market m is analog or 
digital,  is the number of PCS entrants in market m between 1996 and 1998, 
and  is a vector of control variables for incumbent i and market m.  The interaction 
variable between provider technology, plan type, and number of entrants isolates the 
effect of entry on the incumbents’ choices of number of plans by technology.  Table 6 
displays the results of different specifications of this regression based on linear regression 
techniques.  The standard errors in the table have been adjusted to account for non-
random clustering in the data since we observe some carriers in more than one market. 
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Specification I controls for market demographics that might affect incumbents’ choice of 
number of plans and uses incumbent fixed-effects to control for firm-specific differences 
in the response to entry.  It treats entry as exogenous, consistent with our hypothesis that 
entry is primarily determined by governmental policy.  Under this assumption, we find 
that entry has a significant effect on the change in the number of plans offered by 
incumbent providers for both analog-only providers and mixed-technology providers.  An 
additional entrant in a market with a mixed-technology provider is associated with an 
average decrease of 0.38 in the number of analog plans and an increase of 0.49 in the 
number of digital plans.  Incumbents thus phase out more analog plans and introduce 
more digital plans in markets where they face more entrants.  The effect is also 
economically significant given that the mean number of plans in a market is 
approximately six and the mean number of entrants in a market is over two.  Similar to 
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the digital portfolios of mixed-technology providers, we find that analog-only incumbents 
increase the number of plans offered by 0.44 for each additional entrant.  The effect of 
entry on digital-only incumbents is positive but not significant.  This coefficient is 
difficult to estimate precisely since the instances in which a carrier offers only digital 
service in a market are rare – only 15 of the 306 observations in our sample.  Overall, 
these results are consistent with incumbents increasing tariff variety in markets where 
they face more competition.  At the same time, incumbents also phase out tariffs for 
obsolete technologies more heavily in markets with more competitors. 
 
We include measures of heterogeneity in demand within the market to reflect that carriers 
may base the introduction of new calling plans on the heterogeneity in consumer tastes.  
None of the heterogeneity measures has a significant effect on the change in the 
incumbents’ tariff portfolio.  As a robustness check, we also estimated the model using 
levels of the demographic variables.  The results do not differ significantly from those 
discussed here, and as in the case of the heterogeneity measures, levels do not 
significantly affect the change in the number of plans offered by a provider. 
 
To control for the possibility of endogenous entry into markets that are more attractive in 
unobservable ways, we use two-stage least squares techniques to re-estimate equation 
(10) under two specifications.  In both specifications, we explain the possibly endogenous 
entry variable based on the instruments discussed above, including the area and 
population of the city, its degree of urbanization, the city’s elevation and the standard 
deviation of its elevation.  The first-stage regression has an adjusted R2 of 0.42 indicating 
that the instruments are reasonably predictive of the timing of entry.  Specification II in 
Table 6 replicates the earlier results.  Most coefficients are similar in sign and magnitude; 
however, we estimate less precise coefficients than before.  Entry continues to be 
associated with the introduction of additional calling plans in digital calling families by 
either digital-only or mixed technology providers, although the effect is only significant 
for the mixed providers.  Similarly, we again find that analog offerings by mixed 
providers are reduced significantly in markets with more entry.  It is only the effect of 
entry on plan offerings by analog incumbents that changes in sign relative to the OLS 
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regression.  An additional entrant reduces the number of plans offered by analog 
incumbents by 0.46 plans, although the effect is not significant.  This is the main effect of 
instrumenting, which implies that there are omitted variables associated with both 
additional entry and reduced plan offerings in analog-only markets.  One possible factor 
is growth in cellular demand in a market, which we are unable to measure, that would 
attract entry and, at the same time, place constraints on the existing analog capacity of 
incumbents, inducing them to phase out analog plans. 
 
Our theoretical model predicts that a higher fixed cost of offering a plan should counter 
strategic incentives to offer a broader portfolio of calling plans in response to entry.  To 
test this, we gather data on acquisition of radio advertising time across markets to proxy 
for marketing costs.  With greater marketing costs per tariff (the K in our model), the 
fixed cost of offering an additional tariff is more difficult to recover and is increasingly 
difficult with a greater number of competitors.  The third specification in Table 6 
includes the marketing cost variable interacted with the instrumented number of entrants 
in the market to determine its effect on the change in the number of plans offered by 
firms in that market.  We allow for a differential effect of marketing expenditures on 
analog portfolios offered by mixed-technology providers since the mixed-technology 
providers have already begun to phase out the analog calling families and may no longer 
be promoting them actively. 
 
The results provide only weak evidence for the importance of fixed costs in driving the 
introduction or elimination of calling plans.  Given the ongoing transition to digital 
service by mixed technology providers and the sunk nature of marketing costs, we do not 
have a prior expectation of how marketing costs will affect these plan families.  We find 
that higher marketing expenditures significantly limit the introduction of these calling 
plans but that the effect is significantly attenuated with more entry.  In a market with no 
entrants and evaluated at the means of the variables, a 10 percent increase in radio 
marketing costs is associated with 0.2 fewer analog plans being offered by mixed 
providers.  In a market with four entrants, an increase in radio marketing costs is 
associated with no net change in the number of analog calling plans offered by mixed 
28 
providers.  For digital plans and analog plans offered in analog-only markets, the results 
are consistent with the predictions of our theoretical model but are not significant.  A 10 
percent increase in radio marketing costs with no entry is associated with 0.022 fewer 
plans being offered in these markets and the effect is reinforced by increased entry so that 
a market with four entrants is associated with 0.078 fewer plans.  The insignificance of 
these results may reflect that radio advertising costs are but one of the costs incurred 
when offering a new tariff.  Alternatively, the results could also signal that fixed costs of 
offering additional tariffs are not very significant, which is consistent with the strategic 
effect dominating the cost effect. 
 
Since the variables that measure plan change and number of entrants are discrete, we 
estimate an ordered probit version of both equations.  We simultaneously estimate the 
plan choice and instrumenting equation to allow for correlation in the errors between the 
two.  We implement this using a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator.  
We assess parameter significance using a bootstrap sample of 200 replications and 
control for non-random clustering of unobservables by firm.30 
 
The estimated coefficients and marginal effects of this model, including the marketing 
costs variables (the equivalent of Specification III in Table 6), are shown as Specification 
I in Table 7.  The results are similar to the 2SLS results in Table 6 although the 
coefficients are in general slightly less significant.  As in the 2SLS results, incumbents in 
both single and mixed-technology markets with more entrants reduce the number of 
analog plans more than incumbents in markets with fewer entrants, although the 
magnitude of the change is greater in the single technology market and less in the mixed 
technology markets.  The results again suggest that incumbents in markets with more 
entrants introduced more digital plans than in markets with fewer entrants although the 
magnitudes are much greater here.  Only two demographics variables are mildly 
                                                 
30 The bootstrap procedure recognizes the clustering in the data.  We first create a list of firms in our 
sample.  For each iteration of the bootstrap procedure, we draw a firm from this list and use observations 
from all of the markets in which the firm operates in that iteration’s data set.  We keep adding randomly-
drawn firms to the dataset until the number of plan/company/market observations is equal to or just 
exceeds the number of observations in the actual data set and the bootstrap sample contains at least one 
observation for each level of the plan change and entry variables. 
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significant; a market’s population has a positive effect on the number of plans offered but 
is significant only at the 18% level, while commuting time also has a positive effect at the 
14% level.  The marketing variables here have similar effects to those found in the 2SLS 
estimation, but are not as significant.  In a market with no entrants and evaluated at the 
means of the variables, a 10 percent increase in radio marketing costs is associated with 
0.13 fewer analog plans being offered by mixed providers.  In an identical market with 
four entrants, the same 10 percent increase in radio marketing costs is associated with 
0.014 fewer analog calling plans being offered.  As with the 2SLS estimates, for digital 
plans and analog plans offered in analog-only markets, the results are consistent with the 
predictions of our theoretical model but are not significant.  A 10 percent increase in a 
market with four entrants is associated with 0.052 fewer plans. 
 
The results in Table 6 are conditional on the technology choice made by the incumbents 
in each market.  Our data can also inform the importance of entry in driving the 
incumbents’ technology adoption choices.  Consequently, we estimate an alternative, 
seemingly unrelated regression model that specifies the incumbents’ technology adoption 
choices and their plan offering choices jointly as a system of equations, both of which are 
affected by entry.  At the same time, we explicitly incorporate the discrete outcome data 
that we observe for the change in the number of calling plans and the number of entrants.  
We specify both the first-stage entry equation and the second stage plan offering equation 
as ordered probit models and the technology adoption equation as a binary probit: 
( )( )( )
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where  is an indicator variable equal to one if firm i has implemented the digital 
technology in market m by 1998 and zero otherwise, ,  and  are vectors of 
control variables for incumbent i and market m.   is a normal error term that gives rise 
to a probit model for the technology adoption equation, while  and  are normal 
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error terms that give rise to ordered probit models for the plan change and entry 
equations.  We use the same instrumental variables to control for the possible 
endogeneity of the number of entrants as in the linear calling plan regressions.  We 
employ a GMM estimator to estimate the system of equations with an ordered probit 
first-stage estimation of the entry equation again allowing for potential correlation of 
errors across equations. 
 
Specification II of Table 7 displays both the estimated coefficients and marginal effects 
from this model.  We use bootstrap techniques based on 200 replications to assess 
parameter significance and control for non-random clustering of errors by firm.  The 
digital technology adoption decision equation shows that amount of entry has a highly 
significant and positive effect on the likelihood of adopting the new technology.  The 
effect is also economically significant.  Each additional entrant increases the probability 
of adopting the new technology by 13 percent.  The demographic and firm scope 
variables are in general not significant.  The only significant effect is that firms in 
markets with higher consumer incomes are more likely to adopt the new technology. 
 
The results for the plan change equation are similar to those obtained in Specification I of 
Table 7 although the magnitudes of the effects are somewhat different.  As before, the 
results imply that mixed providers in markets with more entry eliminate more analog 
plans and introduced more digital plans than mixed providers in markets with less entry, 
however, the marginal effect of entry on tariff variety is approximately half the previous 
amount.  The effect on digital plan introductions by mixed providers is very significant 
while the effect on analog plans is significant only at the 17% level.  Entry induces firms 
that completely transitioned to the digital technology prior to 1998 to introduce additional 
plans, however the effect is not statistically significant.  Finally, we find a statistically 
very significant, negative effect of additional entry on the change in the number of plans 
offered by firms who remain with the old analog technology.  This may be a sign that 
such carriers, while not yet having explicitly introduced digital service, are anticipating 
its introduction by slowly phasing out plans on the old technology.  The only control 
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variable that is moderately significant is that for small geographic scope of the firm, 
significant at the 16% level. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Overall, our results are consistent with higher concentration being associated with fewer 
tariffs.  Cellular incumbents expand the number of tariffs most in markets with more PCS 
entrants.  This is consistent with cellular incumbents, when they faced only one other 
firm in 1996, having less incentive to undercut their competitors by introducing 
additional calling plans and incurring the fixed costs of administering multiple plans.  
With entry by PCS carriers between 1996 and 1998, the incumbents face more external 
competition and an increased incentive to “fill the tariff space” to steal customers whose 
tastes were not closely served by their existing menu of calling plans.  This effect 
overwhelmed the incentive to avoid additional fixed costs. 
 
We also find that entry indirectly affects plan offerings through its influence on 
technology adoption.  Incumbents in markets with more competitors are more likely to 
transition from analog to digital transmission technologies and to more drastically phase 
out the old analog plans if they continued to promote both technologies. 
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Table 1 
Second Stage Equilibrium with Outside Good Price of 0.8 
(p0=0.8, P0=0) 
2 3 4 5 6
Industry Profits 0.1375 0.1417 0.1427 0.1432 0.1435
Firm Profits 0.0687 0.0472 0.0357 0.0286 0.0239
Fraction Served 0.5152 0.5473 0.5555 0.5592 0.5613
Consumer Welfare 0.0449 0.0440 0.0438 0.0438 0.0437
Industry Profits 0.1384 0.1440 0.1455 0.1462 0.1466
Firm Profits 0.0692 0.0480 0.0364 0.0292 0.0244
Fraction Served 0.5213 0.5660 0.5787 0.5846 0.5880
Consumer Welfare 0.0447 0.0436 0.0434 0.0433 0.0433
Industry Profits 0.1384 0.1443 0.1460 0.1467 0.1472
Firm Profits 0.0692 0.0481 0.0365 0.0293 0.0245
Fraction Served 0.5216 0.5682 0.5824 0.5892 0.5931
Consumer Welfare 0.0447 0.0436 0.0433 0.0432 0.0432
Notes:
This table shows the total industry profits, per-firm profits, fraction of consumers served and total
consumer welfare in the second stage of the theoretical model with different numbers of firms and
tariffs. In computing the equilibria, we have set the price of the outside good to 0.8 and the fixed fee
for the outside good to 0.
Number of Firms in Market
Two Tariff Equilibrium
Four Tariff Equilibrium
Six Tariff Equilibrium
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Table 2 
Activation of PCS Systems in Top-100 CMAs by Launch Quarter 
Fourth Quarter 1995 – Second Quarter 1998 
Quarter of 
Launch
Number of 
Launches
Average Build-Out 
Time (Months)
Average Market 
Size
Q4-1995 2 11.0 3,538,229               
Q1-1996      - - -                          
Q2-1996 2 13.0 1,062,081               
Q3-1996 10 16.6 908,211                  
Q4-1996 27 20.2 2,106,664               
Q1-1997 11 23.4 1,136,711               
Q2-1997 26 26.0 2,031,952               
Q3-1997 17 28.2 2,320,415               
Q4-1997 23 30.0 2,099,855               
Q1-1998 8 33.1 2,351,390               
Q2-1998 22 26.8 1,900,680               
Total 148 25.3 1,951,804               
Source: PCS Week , various issues.
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Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics, Plan Characteristics 
 
Plan Features, across Providers
1996 1998
Change, 
1996 to 
1998 1996 1998
Change, 
1996 to 
1998
Analog Plans Mean 77.31 72.06 5.25 229.85 301.05 71.20
Std. Deviation 63.06 64.87 -1.81 343.91 470.98 127.07
Minimum 9.95 9.95 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Maximum 449.95 592.99 -143.04 3000.00 3560.00 560.00
Median 50.00 47.55 2.45 90.00 120.00 30.00
# of Plans 1,145 1,017 -128 1,145 1,017 -128
Digital Plans Mean 73.24 555.74
Std. Deviation 47.96 558.04
Minimum 14.95 0.00
Maximum 279.99 3000.00
Median 54.99 350.00
# of Plans 713 713
Average Plan Features, within Provider
1996 1998
Change, 
1996 to 
1998 1996 1998
Change, 
1996 to 
1998
Analog Plans Mean 77.31 72.06 -5.25 229.85 301.05 71.20
Std. Deviation 28.39 26.10 -2.29 151.22 195.82 44.60
Minimum 24.99 18.99 -6.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Maximum 175.50 163.59 -11.91 625.00 1085.00 460.00
Median 77.31 72.06 -5.25 229.85 301.05 71.20
# of Plan Families 195 178 -17 195 178 -17
Digital Plans Mean 73.24 555.74
Std. Deviation 15.34 198.41
Minimum 29.98 60.00
Maximum 114.99 1287.50
Median 71.74 517.14
# of Plan Families 132 132
Included Peak MinutesFixed Fee
Fixed Fee Included Peak Minutes
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Table 4 
Descriptive Statistics, 98 Largest Cellular Markets 
Obser-   
vations Mean
Standard 
Deviation Min Max
193 5.89 1.30 3.00 8.00
193 8.69 3.25 3.00 17.00
Analog Plan Groups, if offered, 1998 178 5.78 1.73 1.00 10.00
Digital Plan Groups, if offered, 1998 128 5.06 1.58 2.00 9.00
193 2.80 3.47 -5.00 12.00
Analog Plan Groups, if offered 178 -0.07 1.92 -6.00 5.00
Digital Plan Groups, if offered 128 5.06 1.58 2.00 9.00
306 0.58 0.49 0.00 1.00
306 0.42 0.49 0.00 1.00
193 0.34 0.47 0.00 1.00
193 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00
193 0.59 0.49 0.00 1.00
24 12.75 15.59 1.00 48.00
24 0.63 0.49 0.00 1.00
24 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00
98 2.17 1.08 0.00 4.00
Zero Entrants 98 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00
One Entrant 98 0.26 0.44 0.00 1
Two Entrants 98 0.27 0.44 0.00 1.00
Three Entrants 98 0.33 0.47 0.00 1.00
Four Entrants 98 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00
98 1,524.66 1,662.93 175.20 9,519.34
98 24.58 3.25 19.00 38.90
98 44.03 7.18 31.05 74.34
98 24.41 5.43 13.09 41.66
Heterogeneity in Commuting Time 98 87.57 1.06 84.58 89.98
Heterogeneity in Income 98 92.46 0.23 91.68 93.09
Heterogeneity in Education 98 83.97 1.82 77.14 86.80
Radio Advertising Costs 90 58.6 63.44 11.00 393.00
Notes:
1 The unit of observation is the market and provider, measuring the percent of providers that offer a given
technology in the market, but not whether the provider offers analog, digital, or both technologies on its entire
network across markets.
All Plans offered by Provider
Plan Group Characteristics, 1998
Percent of Analog Plan Groups
All Plans offered by Provider, 1998
    Variable 
Number of Plans Offered in a Plan Group
Analog Plan Groups, 1996
Percent of Providers with Small Potential Network
Percent of Digital Plan Groups
Providers' Technology Choice by Market, 1998
Percent of Analog Only Providers1
Percent of Digital Only Providers1
Average Commuting Time (mins)
Household Income (000)
Percent with B.A. or more
Change in the Number Plans Offered, 1996-98
Percent of Providers with Large Potential Network
Entrants per Market
Market Characteristics
Population (000)
Percent of Mixed Technology Providers1
Number of Markets Present
.00
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Table 5 
Variable Description and Data Sources 
 Variable Description Data Source
Chg_Plans Change in the number of plans offered by cellular 
incumbents in each market within a given technology 
(analog or digital).
Kagan World 
Media
Prov_Analog Indicator variable: Provider offers analog service only in 
both 1996 and 1998
Prov_Mixed Indicator variable: Provider offers separate analog and 
digital plan choices in 1998
Prov_Digital Indicator variable: Provider offers digital service only in 
1998
Plans_Analog Indicator variable: Plan group's technology is analog
Plans_Digital Indicator variable: Plan group's technology is digital
Entrants Number of PCS entrants into the market between 1996 
and 1998
Small Potential Network Indicator variable: Provider offers cellular service in at 
most 5 of the top 100 cellular markets
Large Potential Network Indicator variable: Provider offers cellular service in 
more than 15 of the top 100 cellular markets
Population MSA population in thousands Census 2000
Average Commuting Time Average commuting time in minutes
Household Income Household income in thousands of dollars
Percent with B.A. or more Percent of the MSA population with at least a B.A. 
dHeterogeneity in 
Communting Time
Heterogeneity index. Groups classify shares of workers 
with commuting time. Categories begin at 5, 10, 15, 20, 
25, 30, 35, 40, 45, 60, and 90 minutes.
Heterogeneity in Household 
Income
Heterogeneity index. Groups classify shares of 
households with income in thousands. Categories begin 
at $10, $15, $20, $25, $30, $35, $40, $45, $50, $60, $75, 
$100, $125, $150, $200.
Heterogeneity in 
Educational Attainment
Heterogeneity index. Groups: shares of population 25 
years and over with less than a 9th grade education; 9th-
12th grade education; high school graduate or higher, 
no BA; bachelor's degree or higher.
% City Percent of the MSA area that is within the MSA's 
central cities.
Radio Advertising Costs Cost per rating point of men 18 and older for a 60-
second spot in 1997.
Marketer's Guide 
to Media, 1998
Average Elevation Elevation averaged across regular grid points in the 
MSA.
Std. Deviation of Elevation Standard deviation in elevation at regular grid points in 
the MSA.
The heterogeneity index for commuting time, household income and educational attainment is defined as:
US Geological 
Survey
∑−=
i
igroup
2)(1Indexity Heterogene
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Table 6 
Changes in the Menu of Plans offered by Cellular Incumbents, 1996-1998 
Technologies offered by Provider in 1998
Prov_Analog -0.93740 0.20678 -0.77406
(1.2215) (1.9554) (2.4033)
Prov_Mixed 0.44683 0.57089 0.20278
(0.9887) (1.4046) (1.4501)
Plans' Type of Technology
Plans_Digital 3.12103 *** 2.73147 *** 0.97560
(.52212) (0.7434) (1.4038)
Entry by PCS Providers
Prov_Analog*Entrants 0.44490 ** -0.45968 -0.88324
(0.2264) (0.5122) (0.7081)
Prov_Digital*Entrants 0.39410 0.24824 0.14171
(0.3991) (0.5686) (0.5673)
Prov_Mixed*Plans_Analog*Entrants -0.38202 * -0.68835 ** -1.34120 ***
(0.2143) (0.2994) (0.4741)
Prov_Mixed*Plans_Digital*Entrants 0.49236 *** 0.33875 * 0.42440
(0.1551) (0.1870) (0.4243)
Population 0.00002 0.00004 0.00037 **
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Demand Heterogeneity Measures
Commuting Time Index -0.08965 0.01036 0.07399
(0.1481) (0.1685) (0.2092)
Household Income Index -0.71076 -0.50103 -0.73881 *
(0.4342) (0.3369) (0.3812)
Educational Attainment Index -0.01583 0.06050 0.11697
(0.0757) (0.0692) (0.0866)
Marketing Costs
Radio Ad Cost*Mixed_Analog -0.03412 **
(0.0154)
Radio Ad Cost*(1-Mixed_Analog) -0.00377
(0.0186)
Radio Ad Cost*Mixed_Analog*Entrants 0.00858 *
(0.0048)
Radio Ad Cost*(1-Mixed_Analog)*Entrants -0.00241
(0.0062)
Included Fixed Effects
Observations 306 306 282
R-Squared / Adjusted R-Squared 0.7373 0.7302 0.7408
Dependent variable: change from 1996 to 1998 in the number of plans offered by technology. Clustered
standard errors in parentheses. * = 10% significance, ** = 5% significance, *** = 1% significance. The variable
Mixed_Analog equals Prov_Mixed*Plans_Analog. Specifications II and III are two-stage least squares
regressions. The results from the first-stage regression, together with the corresponding standard errors in
parentheses, are given by:
where POP  denotes the 1999 CMA population, AREA  the CMA's landarea, %CITY  the percentage of the
area that falls within the central cities of the CMA, and ELEV-AVG  and ELEV-SD  the average and
standard deviation of the CMA's elevation, respectively. The first stage regression furthermore includes
six region indicators.
Instrumental Variables Regression
ProviderProvider
Specification I Specification II Specification III
Provider
ε+−−+
−+−=
 44160 14080 %  4208.0
0016.01031.00008009080
)1672.1()3081.0()9562.0(
)0023.0(
2
)906.0()0002.0(
2
)0194.0(
 ELEV-SD. ELEV-AVG.CITY
 AREA AREA POP. POP.ENTRANTS
Linear Instrumental Variables Model 
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Table 7 
Changes in the Menu of Plans Offered by Cellular Incumbents, 1996 – 1998 
GMM Estimation of Discrete Models 
 
95% Confiden- 
ce Interval Marg. Effect
95% Confiden- 
ce Interval Marg. Effect
Plan Change Equation
Prov_Analog 2.23683 (-2.9314,6.3073) 2.68639 1.971096 (2.1769,5.0951) 2.58839
Prov_Mixed 0.38567 (-4.1563,2.6943) 0.46318 0.38525 (-3.1518,1.9465) 0.50590
Plans' Type of Technology
Plans_Digital 0.34395 (-2.2123,15.4408) 0.41307 2.271562 (0.9222,3.6555) 2.98295
Entry by PCS Providers
Prov_Analog*Entrants -1.82050 ** (-3.060,-0.2791) -2.18639 -0.94529 ** (-2.3813,-0.1576) -1.24133
Prov_Digital*Entrants 0.57761 (-0.6346,1.6522) 0.69370 0.40206 (-1.0974,0.8451) 0.52797
Prov_Mixed*
     (Plans_Analog)*Entrants -0.78317 * (-2.4527,0.0133) -0.94057 -0.23031 (-0.7244,0.1127) -0.30244
Prov_Mixed*
     (Plans_Digital)*Entrants 0.84315 ** (0.0697,1.9549) 1.01261 0.50789 *** (0.1391,0.7050) 0.66694
Population 0.00021 (-0.0005,0.0001) 0.00025 -0.00006 (-0.0001,0.0001) -0.00008
Demand Heterogeneity
Commuting Time Index 0.22325 (-0.4179,0.0506) 0.26812 0.05948 (-0.1979,0.1479) -0.07811
Household Income Index -0.35412 (-0.1705,0.8776) -0.42529 -0.31953 (-0.6945,0.1347) -0.41960
Edu. Attainment Index 0.14914 (-0.2557,0.1120) 0.17911 0.09183 (-0.0255,0.1659) 0.12059
Marketing Costs
Radio Ad Cost*Mixed_Analog -0.01848 (-0.0146,0.1476) -0.02219
Radio Ad Cost*(1-Mixed_Analog) 0.02238 (-0.0468,0.0068) 0.04348
Radio Ad Cost*
     Mixed_Analog*Entrants 0.00414 (-0.0489,0.0322) 0.00497
Radio Ad Cost*
     (1-Mixed_Analog)*Entrants -0.01088 (-0.0086,0.0210) -0.01307
Digital Adoption Decision Equation
Entrants 0.33838 *** (0.1680,0.4457) 0.13128
Percent with B.A. or more -0.01912 (-0.0601,0.0462) -0.00742
Commuting Time 0.02738 (-0.0333,0.0675) 0.01062
Population -0.00147 (-0.0054,0.0097) -0.00057
Household Income 0.01130 * (-0.0087,0.0412) 0.00438
Large Geographic Scope 0.550878 (-0.1467,0.5303) 0.21372
Small Geographic Scope 0.735686 (-0.1060,0.9237) 0.28542
Observations
Provider fixed effects included in both plan change and digital adoption decision equations. Numbers in parentheses provide
95% confidence interval using the bootstrap percentile method. Provider fixed effects included. * = 10% significance, ** = 5%
significance, *** = 1% significance. The plan change equation is estimated as an instrumented ordered Probit model.
Specification II estimates the plan change equation as an instrumented ordered Probit model and the digital adoption equation
as an instrumented Probit model in a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) system of equations. The system is estimated via
GMM using all exogenous variables and polynomial functions of the exogenous variables as instruments. The 95% confidence 
intervals are based on 200 bootstrap samples that account for non-random clustering of errors by firm. The estimated
coefficients of the first stage entry equation, together with the corresponding 95% confidence interval based on the
bootstrap percentile method in parenthese, are for Specification I:
and for Specification II:
where POP denotes the 1999 CMA population, AREA the CMA' ndarea, %CITY the percentage of the area that falls within
the central cities of the CMA, and ELEV-AVG and ELEV-SD the average and standard deviation of the CMA's elevation. The
first stage regression furthermore includes six region indicators.
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Figure 1 
Marketing Cost Structure of Calling Plans, 1996 and 1998 
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Source: Annual marketing expenditures are taken from “Mobile Metrics – Fall 1999,” Salomon Smith 
Barney, September 10, 1999.  Data are for Airtouch, ALLTEL, Ameritech, AT&T, Bell Atlantic, 
BellSouth, Century Telephone, Comcast Corporation, GTE Corporation, SBC Communications, and United 
States Cellular for 1996 and 1998. 
The fitted line represents the predicted values from the regression:  
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Figure 2 
Gains From Deviation: Two versus Three Plans 
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The figure shows the maximum additional profits an oligopolist can obtain by deviating from offering two 
tariffs to offering three tariffs in the theoretical model as a function o
The maximum deviation is defined as the profits the oligopolist coul
f the number of firms in the market.  
d obtain if it slightly undercut each of 
its competitors’ two tariffs by offering three tariffs.  In computing the equilibria, we have set the price of 
e outside good to 0.8 and the fixed fee for the outside good to 0. th
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Figure 3 
Major Trading Areas and Cellular Market Areas 
 
This map shows the geographic market areas for cellular service.  The dark bordered regions are the 51 
MTAs and the light-bordered areas are the CMAs. 
 
 
Figure 4 
Average Change in the Number of Plans offered by Incumbents 
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This graph displays the relationship between the average change in the number of plans in a market and the 
number of entrants in a market for four different plan family/provider types: digital plans offered by mixed 
providers, digital plans offered by digital-only providers, analog plans offered by mixed providers and 
analog plans offered by analog-only providers. 
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